CleanTech Lithium

One of the best lithium stories in the market?

Good Morning Team.

This thesis may be too long for email, so consider heading to the webpage.

There is a lagoon in the Atacama Desert, sitting at 4,300 metres above sea level in northern Chile, on one of the most significant lithium brine deposits the country has designated for private development.

A paved international highway runs within 200 metres of it.

The Chilean government has just handed the company that controls it a 40 year exclusive operating contract.

Independent engineers from Worley — one of the world’s most respected engineering firms — have assessed the project at $959 million after tax (NPV8).

Two separate brokerage houses, using two entirely different valuation methodologies, have independently arrived at price targets of 20p and 22p per share.

The company that owns all of this has a market capitalisation of less than £20 million.

This is the story of CleanTech Lithium.

It’s the story of what the company has built, what the market has failed to price, what needs to happen next - and why the gap between these things has created a valuation disconnect that’s looking pretty hard for me to ignore.

But this is also a story about lithium — where the market has come from, where it’s going, and why 2026 looks increasingly like the inflection point.

In the last lithium run, millionaires were minted. This time, there’s new names: I’ve covered Bradda Head and Switch Metals recently.

But a rising tide lifts all boats.

And this boat is better than most.

The Lithium Market in 2026

You already know the broad narrative.

Electric vehicles. Battery storage. The energy transition.

Net zero.

But the lithium story in 2026 is more nuanced — and ultimately more compelling — than those headlines suggest. To understand why CleanTech enjoys strategic positioning, you first need to understand the market it’s survived.

After one of the most brutal commodity corrections in recent memory, battery-grade lithium carbonate crashed approximately 85% from a late-2022 peak of over $80,000 per tonne to a trough of around $8,300 per tonne during mid-2025.

The cause was a classic oversupply shock: Australian spodumene miners and Chinese processing capacity ramped aggressively into a demand curve that was growing fast but not fast enough.

Projects were deferred. Write-downs were taken across the sector. Companies went bust.

Junior developers who had been valued on the assumption of sustained high prices found their market caps eviscerated.

I know, because I was there.

CleanTech was among them — the stock fell from the equivalent of £1.80 at its peak to a 52-week low of 4.3p.

Then the recovery came — faster, harder and more structurally grounded than anyone expected.

By late March 2026, international seaborne battery-grade lithium carbonate was trading at approximately $18,000–20,000 per tonne.

That represents a recovery of roughly 120% from the mid-2025 trough in under 12 months. Chinese domestic futures briefly surged to a two-year high of approximately CNY180,000 per tonne in January 2026 before consolidating.

Seaborne spot as of early June 2026 is already above $24,000 per tonne — above the $22,500 base case used in CTL’s Pre-Feasibility Study.

Critically, this recovery is not driven by a single transient factor (we’ve seen spikes and dips before) but reflects a confluence of structural supply disruptions that are unlikely to quickly reverse.

In China’s Jiangxi province (the country’s largest lithium-producing region) the government recently cancelled 27 mining permits as part of its anti-overcapacity (anti-involution) campaign.

CATL suspended operations at its Jianxiawo mine, one of China’s largest integrated lithium operations. Combined, the Jiangxi disruptions represent a structural reduction in Chinese domestic production rather than a temporary operational hiccup.

Zimbabwe — Africa’s largest lithium producer — suspended all lithium concentrate exports in February 2026 after shipping 1.128 million tonnes in 2025, primarily to China, tightening the seaborne market materially.

Multiple Australian spodumene producers, battered by the 2023–2025 price environment, curtailed output. Their restarts require time and capital.

And the greenfield project pipeline, decimated by three years of poor prices, has contracted sharply — reducing the future supply response capacity that would normally cap a price recovery.

On the demand side, something important has shifted since the previous cycle. Battery Energy Storage Systems — BESS — now account for approximately 23% of lithium demand, up from around 15% in 2023, and their growth rate is accelerating.

Beijing has doubled its EV charging capacity target to 180 gigawatts by 2027 and made energy storage attachment mandatory for new renewable installations — creating a policy-guaranteed demand floor that operates independently of consumer EV adoption rates.

Data centres and AI infrastructure in North America are also adding 20–30% of annual BESS installations - demand that didn’t exist in 2022.

In other words, lithium demand is no longer primarily a story about electric vehicles but about the entire electrification of the global energy system, with diversified and increasingly policy-mandated demand from multiple independent sources.

S&P Global projects the global lithium carbonate surplus narrowing from approximately 141,000 tonnes LCE in 2025 to approximately 109,000 tonnes in 2026, the first meaningful contraction following three years of oversupply, with Fastmarkets projecting a move toward deficit by year end.

The 2026 sell-side central case price range is approximately $18,000–22,000 per tonne internationally. Long-run incentive pricing (aka the level required to justify new greenfield DLE development capital) is generally cited at $20,000–25,000 per tonne.

Canaccord Genuity’s long-term deck, which underpins the CTL PFS, has recently been revised upward from $22,500 to $23,500 per tonne from 2030.

For a project that will not produce until 2031, the relevant investment question is not where lithium trades today but where it might trade across the 2031–2055 production window.

And at current spot above $24,000 per tonne, the market is already materially above the PFS base case.

That is a different backdrop than at any point since 2023.

The lithium boom is back.

What is CleanTech Lithium?

CleanTech is a Jersey-incorporated, AIM-listed lithium developer with three wholly owned brine assets in Chile’s Atacama region.

1. The flagship is the Laguna Verde project.

2. The secondary development asset is Viento Andino.

3. The early-stage blue sky exploration proposition is Arenas Blancas, on the periphery of the Salar de Atacama.

The company listed on AIM in March 2022 at 60p per share. The stock tripled to as much as 180p during the lithium boom then subsequently de-rated sharply through 2024 and the first half of 2025 alongside the broader sector correction and setbacks in its CEOL application process.

At the trough it reached 4.3p.

It had, pre-placing, since recovered to circa 8p per share, driven by its CEOL agreement in March 2026 and the PFS publication.

Last Thursday, the company announced a placing at 6p per share to raise circa £4.8 million, alongside the conversion of all outstanding convertible loan notes to equity — a balance sheet reset that removes the near-term debt overhang entirely and signals institutional confidence from the note holders themselves.

This placing was obviously needed and my personal view is that raising enough to not have to go back to the market five minutes later is the right call.

Long-suffering long-term investors (of which I am not one here, but elsewhere) are likely thinking this better be the last one.

I think it will be.

The company’s combined resource base across Laguna Verde and Viento Andino comprises 2.82 million tonnes of lithium carbonate equivalent.

Laguna Verde alone has been independently assessed at an after-tax NPV of $959 million, with the PFS completed in late March this year.

The implied EV/Resource multiple at current prices is approximately $6.9 per tonne while its peer median sits at $27.3 per tonne.

The most recent comparable Latin American brine M&A transaction cleared at $43 per tonne.

This leaves the stock trading at a 75% discount to the peer median and a 98% discount to its own independently assessed NPV.

As a fundamentals first investor, you can see the appeal.

Laguna Verde

Laguna Verde is located approximately 265 kilometres east of Copiapó in Chile’s Atacama Region, in a large endorheic basin (a closed hydrological system with no external drainage) anchored by the Laguna Verde hypersaline lagoon at an elevation of more than 4,300 metres above sea level.

The project area can be reached via Route 31, a paved international highway connecting Copiapó to Argentina that passes within 200 metres of the lagoon, providing year-round access and significantly reducing logistics infrastructure requirements relative to more remote salars.

For context, many comparable high-altitude projects require substantial new road construction - and this can make the capex unviable.

The geology is textbook lithium brine country.

The aquifer is predominantly hosted in permeable volcanic tuff units at 150–400 metres depth, with high transmissivity zones adjacent to the lagoon supporting strong, predictable well yields.

Multiple drilling campaigns since 2021 have delineated the extent of this brine system through rotary and diamond drill, pump test programmes and geophysics surveys. Pump tests have confirmed sustainable commercial-scale well yields sufficient to support the 25-year mine plan without aquifer depletion.

The brine chemistry is characterised by lithium concentrations ranging from approximately 174 milligrams per litre on a resource-weighted average basis to 246 mg/L at surface, with grades up to 409 mg/L recorded at depth.

Compared to many volcanic-hosted deposits, the brine has relatively low levels of impurities (think sulphate and calcium), which simplifies impurity removal in the processing circuit and supports the high selectivity and recovery rates demonstrated at pilot scale.

The geology is fundamentally well-suited to Direct Lithium Extraction for several specific reasons.

The brine is lithium-rich and dissolved entirely in solution — ideal for adsorption. And there’s minimal evaporite development, which reduces the scaling risk.

High permeability enables efficient well-based recovery.

The closed basin geometry minimises freshwater dilution.

And the low impurity profile reduces downstream reagent consumption. Laguna Verde’s brine chemistry is essentially what a DLE process engineer would specify if designing a project from scratch.

The JORC-compliant mineral resource, prepared by Montgomery & Associates (an international hydrogeological consultancy highly specialised in groundwater modelling and lithium brine resource estimation) - and effective 30 October 2025, stands at 1.9 million tonnes LCE at an average grade of 174 mg/L.

The breakdown by confidence category is as follows:

• Measured resource of 312,000 tonnes LCE at 169 mg/L (subsurface) plus 78,000 tonnes LCE at 246 mg/L (lake surface resource)

• Indicated resource of 445,000 tonnes LCE at 175 mg/L

• Combined Measured plus Indicated of 835,000 tonnes LCE at 178 mg/L

• Inferred resource of 1,065,000 tonnes LCE at 167 mg/L.

The resource saw a 17% increase in November 2025, from 1.63 million tonnes to 1.9 million tonnes, following the August 2025 acquisition of 30 additional licences from Minergy Chile SpA that lifted polygon coverage above 97% of the government’s defined CEOL area.

Monty has recommended three additional drillholes — in the southwest, north and northeast — to potentially extend the resource boundary further and upgrade the inferred material to higher confidence categories.

This work is expected to be funded under the Phase 1 pre-development programme.

The PFS introduces the first formal Probable Reserve:

378,000 tonnes LCE at an average extracted grade of 186 mg/L, representing 424 million cubic metres of pumped brine, sufficient to support the full 25-year life of mine at 15,000 tonnes per year with no reliance on inferred resources.

Yes, this does sound good.

The reserve represents approximately 20% of the total resource — entirely consistent with PFS-stage conversion ratios for brine projects and a function of conservative modelling rather than resource risk.

The unconverted balance of approximately 1.52 million tonnes LCE remains available for reserve upgrade at DFS stage, representing genuine mine-life extension optionality beyond the 25 years already planned.

Direct Lithium Extraction

Before going further into the project economics, you need to understand the technology, because it underpins both the project’s cost position and its strategic and regulatory positioning in Chile.

Traditional lithium brine production — the method used by SQM and Albemarle at the Salar de Atacama for decades — works as follows:

(caveat, this is heavily simplified)

1. Brine is pumped from the aquifer into large evaporation ponds.

2. Over 12 to 18 months, the sun concentrates the brine.

3. The concentrate is then processed into lithium carbonate.

Simple as that.

Not really, but this is the basic idea - and advances in the space have been exponential over the past five years.

It works.

But for context, it requires vast land areas simply for the evaporation ponds, loses approximately 95% of extracted brine water to evaporation, depletes aquifers over time, and has become increasingly difficult to permit as environmental standards have tightened.

SQM and Albemarle have both faced significant and very understandable community and regulatory pressure over aquifer depletion at the Salar de Atacama.

Direct Lithium Extraction is fundamentally different.

If you take nothing else away from this article, remember this.

Instead of concentrating brine through evaporation, a DLE system selectively captures lithium ions directly from the liquid feed brine using adsorption, ion exchange or membrane technology.

The depleted brine is then reinjected into the aquifer.

This is a process that has been used in other industries for decades (for example, in uranium extraction) but has not been needed for lithium until now given the supply/demand and environmental pressures.

The cycle takes hours or sometimes days rather than 12 to 18 months. Recovery rates are materially higher from moderate-grade brines, water consumption and water loss are both dramatically lower and as a result land use is a fraction of evaporation operations.

And aquifer preservation — the primary long-term operational and environmental risk of legacy operations — is addressed.

For Chile specifically, these characteristics are not only commercial advantages. Chile’s National Lithium Strategy explicitly requires DLE-based processing for all new CEOL awards.

The old school solar evaporation approach is not permissible under the law for new CEOL holders.

CTL’s DLE approach is the only regulatory pathway available, and the government’s reasoning for mandating it reflects an entirely rational assessment of environmental priorities.

The country wants mining that works for them.

Bottom line.

Otherwise, you get the kind of copper tailings disaster Halo Minerals is now seeking to address to mutual benefit.

Now, there are several DLE technology types in various stages of commercial development.

Adsorption-based systems — the type CTL uses — involve alumina or titanium dioxide adsorbent that selectively captures lithium ions in fixed columns, with desorption via dilute acid producing a lithium-rich eluate.

Recovery rates are high (88–92%), selectivity is very high with excellent magnesium-to-lithium selectivity, and the technology has commercial-scale deployment history, primarily in China.

Ion exchange systems using selective resins are also commercial, with Lilac Solutions and SLB NeoLith among technology providers.

Solvent extraction and next-generation membrane technologies like EnergyX’s lithium-ion transport membrane are at pilot and development stage respectively.

But in the end analysis, the adsorption approach CTL has selected sits at the most commercially proven end of the spectrum - and I think regardless of your view on CTL specifically, this specific fact is hard to argue with.

For the Laguna Verde PFS, CTL selected an adsorption DLE system developed by Xi-an Lanshen New Material Technology Co. (hereon going by Lanshen).

Lanshen’s alumina-based adsorbent is the most commercially deployed DLE adsorbent type globally, with a growing track record of commercial-scale installations in China.

The system operates through a fixed-column carousel arrangement - feed brine passes through columns packed with the alumina adsorbent, lithium ions are selectively adsorbed and the loaded columns are then washed and desorbed using dilute acid to produce a dilute lithium chloride eluate.

The carousel arrangement ensures a continuous operation — while some columns are in adsorption mode, others are simultaneously in wash or desorption mode, maintaining constant throughput without any interruption.

CTL commissioned its one-tonne per month (capacity) pilot plant at Copiapó in early 2024 and operated it using real Laguna Verde brine — not synthetic feed.

By the way, this distinction matters.

Companies will tell you that synthetic feed tests create ‘idealised conditions that often don’t reflect actual site-specific brine chemistry.’

What they mean, if I may translate from bullshit into English, is that the synthetic feed will make it look like you have a viable asset - when you don’t. And when you build a real plant and send your brine through it, it’s going to work out about as well as Mrs Tweedy’s pie machine in Chicken Run.

Using real brine means the pilot results are directly applicable to the commercial plant design.

And the results were independently verified by Dorfner Anzaplan in Germany in January 2025.

The verified performance metrics are as follows:

• DLE lithium recovery: 90.0%.

• LiCl plant total recovery including membranes, reverse osmosis, nanofiltration, electrodialysis, and ion exchange: 88.6%.

• Lithium concentration upgrade: 3.6 times, from feed brine at 197 mg/L to eluate at 710 mg/L to concentrated solution at 2,194 mg/L.

• Battery-grade Li₂CO₃ purity: 99.78%, independently verified.

• Sodium rejection: 100%.

• Potassium rejection: 100%.

• Magnesium rejection: 98.8%.

• Calcium rejection: 99.7%.

These are measured results from the actual Laguna Verde brine processed through the actual pilot plant, independently verified by a respected German lab. The technology risk in the PFS is therefore substantially lower than for projects relying on ‘projected’ performance.

The modular Lanshen design is a further commercial advantage.

The PFS plant is configured with 30 adsorption columns arranged in 10 carousels of 3 columns each, scalable in 5,000 tonne per year increments.

This means expansion at Laguna Verde (or potentially, integration with Viento Andino using the same downstream Copiapó carbonation plant) can be achieved by adding modular trains rather than rebuilding the core process.

It also reduces single-point risk: a failure in one column set does not halt the entire plant. And we’ve all seen non-modular plants deal with this exact problem before - including famously at several majors over the past couple of years.

The industry is learning.

And the most important external validation came from Eramet’s Centenario project in Argentina, which started commissioning across 2024–2025 as the first large-scale adsorption DLE operation in Latin America at 24,000 tonnes per year.

Centenario demonstrated to the non-believers (we’re going to Candy Mountain, Charlie) that adsorption-based DLE can be deployed at commercial scale in Latin American brine conditions with recoveries and process stability broadly consistent with pilot-scale projections.

This was the technology precedent that was absent from the investment case 18 months ago.

It’s also part of the reason I’ve waited to enter the story.

This tech is now proven.

CTL is also evaluating DuPont Water Solutions’ nanofiltration membrane technology as a complementary upstream concentration step.

Nanofiltration membranes selectively reject divalent ions — aka magnesium and sulphate — while allowing monovalent ions — aka lithium and sodium — to pass.

Applied upstream of the DLE adsorption columns, this could improve the lithium-to-magnesium ratio of the feed brine entering the adsorbent, reducing impurity load on the adsorbent, extending its working life and reducing reagent consumption downstream.

Which makes the OPEX cheaper.

Early test results have exceeded expectations for impurity removal and lithium recovery. This technology is not in the PFS base case — meaning the $5,768 per tonne OPEX does not assume any benefit from it.

Positive results at DFS stage represent potential additional downside cost protection rather than an upside assumption.

The CEOL Foundation

Everything, literally everything in the CleanTech Lithium investment case flows from one thing: the CEOL.

CEOL stands for Contrato Especial de Operación de Litio — in English, Special Lithium Operating Contract.

Under Chile’s National Lithium Strategy, announced by then President Boric in April 2023, all new commercial lithium projects must operate under a government-granted CEOL.

The framework replaced the previous ad-hoc system with a formal process governed by clear eligibility criteria. Without a CEOL, no project can advance to construction or production in Chile.

Without one, Laguna Verde is a collection of drilling data and processing pilots with no commercial pathway. With one, it is a fundable, developable 40-year producing asset with the contractual backing of the Chilean state.

And one fact defines the entire competitive landscape: only one CEOL can be awarded per salar.

One, exclusively.

Whoever receives it has the permanent, exclusive legal right to commercially develop that salar.

Nobody else can.

Ever.

Tenured control is therefore of paramount strategic importance for any lithium developer in Chile.

In 2023, the government identified six priority salars for the first wave of CEOL awards. Laguna Verde was among them.

Of those six priority salars, it’s the only one where a junior company holds a dominant licence position — the remaining priority salars are controlled by CODELCO/SQM legacy structures or major international groups.

CTL’s position was differentiated within the Chilean lithium opportunity set from the outset.

The road to approval was paved with potholes. CTL applied for the CEOL in January 2025 under the new procedures and was rejected in April 2025 because its mining licence coverage of the government’s defined polygon was below the required 80% threshold.

The company appealed, supported by an independent Chilean law firm. The appeal was dismissed in June 2025.

The strategic licence gap was then identified, and the response was decisive: in August 2025, CTL acquired 30 additional licences from Minergy Chile SpA, lifting polygon coverage to over 97% of the government-defined CEOL polygon — materially above the 80% threshold and removing the blockage entirely.

Simultaneously, indigenous community consultations for Laguna Verde (a government-mandated prerequisite under the CEOL framework) were concluded in record time, with all parties in agreement.

The consultations were declared formally closed by the government in December 2025, with the Ministry describing it as one of the quickest community consultation processes across the lithium industry in Chile. The streamlined process for CEOL applications was formally opened on 18 December 2025, with a deadline of 30 January 2026.

CTL submitted its application on 5 January 2026 — a month ahead of the deadline. The application was made through its Chile-based subsidiary Atacama Salt Lakes SpA (ASL) and confirmed coverage of well over 80% of the CEOL polygon.

Three formal indigenous community support letters were included. And a financial consortium partner was engaged to satisfy the government’s minimum $30 million net equity financial criterion.

This consortium structure deserves some careful analysis for investors who have followed the RNS history up to this point.

CTL’s own balance sheet did not meet the $30 million net equity requirement at the time of submission.

To satisfy this, ASL formed a consortium with an anonymous, financially strong minerals company. This partner receives a nominal fee and, on CEOL award, acquires a de minimis minority stake in ASL of significantly less than 0.01%.

CTL holds the exclusive right to require the partner to transfer that shareholding to another party of its choosing at any time for the same nominal price. The intention is that this transfer will involve the strategic partner being selected through the CF&Co process.

The consortium partner is a temporary financial guarantor, not a project co-developer. The arrangement has no meaningful dilutive effect on CTL shareholders and should be understood as an elegant pre-structuring mechanism that enabled CEOL eligibility while preserving full flexibility.

Of course, it could also be a major player looking to retain a foot in the door.

Following several constructive meetings between CEO Ignacio Mehech and the Ministry of Mining, terms were formally agreed on 10 March 2026.

That’s just three months ago.

The 40-year CEOL covers a 153 square kilometre polygon and covers all phases of project development: exploration and evaluation, construction, lithium production and project closure. As far as I can tell, all material economic, commercial and legal terms are substantively consistent with the other CEOLs awarded in Chile.

A final ratification step is required from the Comptroller General’s Office — a constitutional legality check that won’t change the agreed terms — and is expected to complete in Q2 2026.

The Board is unaware of any reason why the Decree would not be processed, but this will be watched closely.

Two prior precedents confirmed the process was functional and that the government was willing to award CEOLs to both majors and juniors: Rio Tinto and ENAMI at Maricunga, and Lithium Chile at Coipasa in 2025.

Lithium Chile’s award was the critical precedent — the first junior company to receive a CEOL, removing any uncertainty that the government would only transact with mining majors.

Another reason I was worried about this in the early days. Gone.

The new Kast administration, inaugurated in mid-March 2026, has explicitly prioritised expedited permitting and pro-investment reform as policy priorities, providing a supportive political backdrop for the remaining steps to construction.

The CEOL contract is legally binding and cannot be unilaterally altered by any government.

It transforms CTL’s risk profile in three concrete ways.

1. It eliminates the regulatory overhang that has suppressed the EV/Resource multiple.

2. It provides the contractual security that strategic partners and project lenders require before committing capital.

3. And it removes the single largest binary risk from the investment case — enabling re-rating from exploration-stage to development-stage multiples.

Pre-Feasibility Study

The PFS (published on 31 March 2026) —

• led by Worley as principal engineer and study integrator

• with Montgomery & Associates for resource and reserve estimation

• Lanshen for DLE process design

• Ad Infinitum for process design review and Competent Person oversight

• Benchmark Minerals Intelligence for lithium product marketing studies

• and Agora Soluciones for brine infrastructure

was the first independent JORC-compliant technical assessment of Laguna Verde at PFS grade.

It supersedes the January 2023 Scoping Study as the primary reference for all investment analysis and incorporates several important advances over that earlier work:

1. first formal Probable Reserve estimate (378,000 tonnes LCE)

2. a more rigorous AACE Class 4 capital cost estimate with an accuracy range of -30% to +45%

3. a confirmed DLE technology selection in Lanshen

4. and a fully defined two-site project configuration

The PFS was clearly held back pending CEOL clarity - and arrived with the CEOL agreed, the engineering complete and the partner process ready to launch.

The project covers a 15,000 tonne per year nameplate capacity of battery-grade lithium carbonate over a 25-year mine life, with a ramp-up schedule as follows:

• 70% capacity in Months 1 and 2

• 85% in Month 3

• 90% in Months 4 and 5

• and 100% from Month 6 onward

Product mix transitions from 50% battery-grade and 50% technical-grade in Year 1, to reaching 95% battery-grade by Year 2 and 100% battery-grade from Year 4, at which point the project operates at expected steady-state economics.

Full-scale production requires 36 vertical production wells, each reaching a total depth of circa 400 metres, screened from 200 to 400 metres below surface, targeting permeable unconsolidated and coarse tuff units, and spaced 400 metres apart.

The top of screen is set at 200 metres depth to minimise dilution from shallow freshwater or reinjected brine.

Wells will be constructed with 10-inch stainless steel casing and equipped with 8-inch submersible pumps. Feed rates are approximately 524 litres per second in Year 1, rising to 568 litres per second from Year 2 onward.

The modelled average extracted lithium concentration over the life of mine is approximately 186 mg/L, with limited dilution over time.

As a reminder, the project operates across two sites connected by Route 31.

At the Laguna Verde salar (Step 1):

Brine is extracted from the 36 production wells, pre-treated to remove suspended solids and then fed to the DLE facility.

The DLE processing facility at Laguna Verde applies Lanshen’s alumina adsorption columns — 30 columns arranged in 10 carousel systems — to selectively capture lithium from the brine matrix.

The loaded columns are washed and desorbed with dilute acid to produce a dilute LiCl eluate at approximately 710 mg/L Li.

DLE recovery at this stage is 90%.

The dilute eluate then passes through a staged membrane concentration and purification circuit: reverse osmosis, nanofiltration, electrodialysis and ion exchange polishing.

This produces a concentrated LiCl solution at 5.88% lithium (approximately 2,194 mg/L Li) suitable for bulk truck transport.

Total LiCl plant recovery including DLE and all membrane stages is 88.6%. Depleted brine and process effluents are reinjected into the basin aquifer and all liquid discards are managed through integrated water recovery systems.

No solid discards are generated from the salar plant.

Transport (Step 2):

The concentrated LiCl solution is then loaded into road tankers at Laguna Verde and transported approximately 265 kilometres away to Copiapó via Route 31.

The significant altitude gradient between the 4,300-metre salar and the approximately 365-metre Copiapó site — roughly 3,935 metres of descent — creates an interesting logistical advantage as electric trucks could take advantage of regenerative charging on the heavily laden downhill run, reducing diesel consumption and carbon intensity.

At Copiapó (Step 3)

The concentrated LiCl solution is converted to battery-grade Li₂CO₃ via soda ash carbonation at approximately 85°C. The conversion process involves a carbonation reactor, solid-liquid separation, hot washing, drying and micronising to meet battery-grade specifications, and a mother-liquor recovery circuit that captures any residual lithium and recycles it back into the process.

The carbonation stage alone achieves 87.2% recovery, with the mother-liquor circuit bringing total Copiapó plant recovery to 96.5%.

Combined with the 88.6% recovery at the LiCl plant, end-to-end recovery is 85.5%.

If my maths is correct.

It usually is - any comments, paste at the end and will amend. It’s likely I’ve missed a small variable given the complexity involved.

The pilot plant at Copiapó produced a verified 99.78% purity battery-grade Li₂CO₃ product — exceeding the Chinese GB/T 23853-2022 Type 1 benchmark of 99.6%.

In April 2026, CTL announced two further validation trials: stage two processing of approximately 60 cubic metres of concentrated eluate at Empower EIT’s new facility in Dallas, Texas, targeting approximately 300 kilograms of battery-grade product for strategic partner qualification testing; and a concurrent smaller-scale programme at Lanshen’s pilot plant in Santiago in Chile, processing 24 cubic metres of Laguna Verde brine into over five kilograms of battery-grade carbonate to validate and optimise the full PFS process flowsheet.

Results from both trials are likely going to hit in Q3, and will provide further independent validation of the process design ahead of DFS commencement.

So, lots of news flow.

The two-site configuration delivers several advantages beyond the obvious footprint reduction.

Approximately 70% of the operational workforce is employed at the Copiapó carbonation plant rather than the remote high-altitude salar, giving the project access to Copiapó’s skilled labour market and reducing the costs and logistical complexity of maintaining a large high-altitude workforce.

The Copiapó plant also creates a regional hub optionality: it can be expanded to process LiCl solution from Viento Andino and potentially other regional projects, meaning the incremental capital required for additional throughput is materially lower than a comparable standalone operation.

In terms of power, electricity is going to be the primary energy input for the project.

The Laguna Verde LiCl plant requires 175,200 MWh per year.

The Copiapó Li₂CO₃ plant requires 19,200 MWh per year.

A non-binding Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) proposal has been prepared by an established Chilean power transmission company for electrical supply to the Laguna Verde site via 130 kilometres of 220 kV transmission lines following the Route 31 highway corridor from an existing substation near La Coipa.

Chile has one of the highest renewable energy penetration rates in the world’s national electricity grids, positioning the project well to secure a 100% renewable energy BOOT agreement — simultaneously reducing both operating costs and carbon intensity.

Geothermal energy studies have also been completed (Laguna Verde is a recognised geothermal site in Chile), alongside solar photovoltaic, wind, and concentrated solar thermal evaluations, all of which will be further assessed at DFS stage.

Basically, energy won’t be a problem.

The LiCl plant also requires approximately 161,000 cubic metres per year of process water (5.6 litres per second). The Copiapó carbonation plant requires no industrial water during normal operations due to full internal recirculation — only start-up water is needed.

Multiple freshwater sources have been identified for the Laguna Verde site: the Peñas Blanca River flows from west to east with continuous year-round flow; and freshwater exploration wells in the western portion of the basin have demonstrated pumping rates of more than 40 litres per second — roughly seven times the project requirement; and the average estimated freshwater recharge of the entire basin is approximately 570 litres per second per the conceptual water balance prepared by Montgomery & Associates — approximately one hundred times the project requirement.

Water rights applications typically require around a year from filing but I think there is no (or close to no) risk here.

Capital and Operating Costs

We’re looking at $748.2 million at $49,900 per tonne.

That Total Installed Cost reflects a Worley AACE Class 4 estimate with an accuracy range of -30% to +45%, consistent with PFS-level engineering maturity.

The cost breakdown by area is as follows:

The Laguna Verde salar site accounts for 46.2% of TIC ($345.5 million), driven by the LiCl process plant ($160 million), production and reinjection wells ($40.8 million), infrastructure ($59.6 million), energy systems ($33.1 million), and general salar items ($39.6 million).

The Copiapó site accounts for 17.2% ($129 million), primarily the lithium carbonate plant ($88.8 million) and associated reception, storage and services infrastructure.

Total direct costs are $474.5 million (63.4% of TIC).

Indirect costs — engineering, procurement and construction management, temporary facilities, a 600-bed construction camp at Laguna Verde, freight and duties, spares and first-fill items including the initial inventory of adsorbents, resins and membranes — total $129.6 million (17.3%).

Owner’s costs are $19 million (2.5%). Contingency is $125.1 million (16.7% of TIC), representing 20% of the base direct and indirect cost estimate and addressing uncertainties including DLE commercial scale-up, high-altitude construction logistics and design maturity.

There’s always a minor delay, and always a hiccup when building anything, so it’s good to see this properly accounted for.

Capital is phased across the two construction years: 35% ($261.9 million) in 2029 and 65% ($486.3 million) in 2030, with no production revenue until 2031.

At approximately $49,900 per tonne of Li₂CO₃, the capex intensity compares favourably with global DLE peers, many of which are above $60,000–80,000 per tonne.

Standard Lithium’s DLE project in the United States, for example, at FID, carries a capex intensity of approximately $64,400 per tonne.

The modular Lanshen plant design, Chile’s established infrastructure advantages and the cost efficiency of the two-site configuration collectively explain the competitive capex intensity.

Sustaining capital averages approximately $9 million per year over the 25-year life of mine, primarily covering adsorbent and resin replacement — a well-defined and highly predictable ongoing cost with no major step changes.

Initial sustaining capex for first fill of adsorbents and resins necessary to commission and operate the facilities totals $42.8 million, incurred just before first commercial production commences.

At $5,768 per tonne of Li₂CO₃ ($86.5 million per year at steady state), Laguna Verde sits in the lowest-cost quartile among DLE developers globally.

For comparison, Lake Resources’ DLE project in Argentina published OPEX of $5,895 per tonne in August 2025. Standard Lithium’s US project carries even higher OPEX. This structural cost advantage provides downside protection against classic lithium price volatility.

The two dominant cost drivers are energy ($2,168 per tonne, 38% of total OPEX) and chemical reagents ($1,970 per tonne, 34%), which together account for around three quarters of total OPEX.

The energy cost reflects the power-intensive DLE adsorption process at the high-altitude salar site but the renewable BOOT power supply arrangement could reduce both costs and carbon intensity at the DFS stage.

The chemical reagents cost is primarily soda ash for the carbonation process, dilute acid for DLE desorption and reagents for the membrane concentration stages.

The remaining 28% of OPEX covers labour (benefiting from Copiapó’s competitive skilled labour market), logistics and transport, maintenance, water, and G&A costs.

The expected AISC - after adding average annual royalties and sustaining capex to OPEX - is approximately $7,853 per tonne — which is still highly competitive globally.

And it seems clear this will be lower at DFS.

Economics — $959 Million and 21.2% After Tax

The economics were calculated on a discounted cash flow basis by Worley, in 2026 US dollars with no inflation escalation applied.

Cash flows are discounted at an 8% real discount rate to the 2029 construction start.

The price deck uses Canaccord Genuity’s November 2025 long-term lithium carbonate forecast of $22,500 per tonne from 2031, held flat in real terms.

This is in line with the $22,400 per tonne average of Fastmarkets’ 20-year forward pricing curve and is conservative relative to current seaborne spot above $24,000 per tonne.

Canaccord has since revised its long-term forecast upward to $23,500 per tonne. The PFS has not yet been updated to reflect this revision, meaning the published economics are based on a price assumption already below current market value.

The project generates average annual revenue of approximately $331 million (15,000 tonnes multiplied by $22,500 per tonne).

Average unlevered post-tax free cash flow is approximately $134 million per year over the 25-year operating life.

Cumulative after-tax cash flows over the life of mine are approximately $3.35 billion.

Every year at steady state, the project generates after-tax free cash flow of approximately five times CTL’s current market capitalisation.

The headline economic metrics across multiple discount rates are as follows:

• Pre-tax NPV at 8%: $1.37 billion.

• Pre-tax IRR: 24.2%.

• Pre-tax payback: 3 years and 11 months from first production.

• After-tax NPV at 8%: $959 million.

• After-tax IRR: 21.2%.

• After-tax payback: approximately 4 years from first production.

• After-tax NPV at 6%: $1.306 billion.

• After-tax NPV at 10%: $699 million.

• After-tax NPV at 0% (simple undiscounted cumulative): $3.354 billion.

If the economics are recalculated on current spot of approximately $28,500 per tonne rather than the base case $22,500 per tonne, after-tax NPV8 would increase from $959 million to approximately $1.456 billion.

Yep.

The sensitivity table across ±10% and ±20% variations in the four key drivers is also important.

At 80% of base case capex ($598 million): NPV $1,094 million.

At 120% of base capex ($891 million): NPV $824 million.

The NPV is relatively insensitive to capex variation — a ±20% capex swing moves NPV by only ±14%.

At 80% of base case lithium price ($18,000 per tonne): NPV $546 million.

At 120% of base price ($27,000 per tonne): NPV $1,357 million.

Price is the dominant driver — a ±20% price variation moves NPV by approximately ±42%.

Even at the severely stressed 80% scenario, NPV remains $546 million — approximately 20 times the current market cap.

At 80% of base case production (12,000 tonnes per year): NPV $635 million.

At 120% (18,000 tonnes per year): NPV $1,279 million.

Production throughput has the second largest impact — ±20% variation moves NPV by approximately ±33%.

At 80% of base OPEX ($4,614 per tonne): NPV $1,063 million.

At 120% ($6,922 per tonne): NPV $852 million.

OPEX is the least sensitive driver — ±20% variation moves NPV by only approximately ±11%, reflecting the structural advantage of its lowest-quartile cost position.

The key investment insight from the sensitivity table is the asymmetry of the downside protection. Even at 80% of base case on every single driver simultaneously — a scenario of simultaneous capex overrun, price weakness, production shortfall and cost blowout — the project retains substantial positive economics.

The lowest-quartile OPEX and the competitive capex intensity create a lovely margin of safety.

CEOL Fiscal Framework — What Chile Takes

The CEOL incorporates five distinct fiscal mechanisms payable to the Chilean state and designated beneficiaries.

Understanding this structure is important because the progressive nature of the royalty — in particular the ad valorem component — creates a very different burden at different price points, and many market participants have overestimated the fiscal impact at base case prices.

Okay, so basically the ad valorem royalty is applied on a progressive marginal basis across defined price bands, analogous to income tax brackets.

Each band is taxed only on the revenue within that band, not on total revenue.

The full marginal rate schedule is:

• 0 to $10,000 per tonne: 1%

• over $10,000 to $15,000: 2.5%

• over $15,000 to $20,000: 5%

• over $20,000 to $25,000: 7.5%

• over $25,000 to $30,000: 20%

• over $30,000 to $35,000: 30%

• over $35,000 to $40,000: 40%

• over $40,000 to $60,000: 50%

• over $60,000: also 50%.

At the PFS base case price of $22,500 per tonne, the effective weighted average ad valorem rate is approximately 2.94%, yielding around $9.9 million per year at steady state.

Note that the rate accelerates sharply above $25,000 per tonne — the 20% marginal rate for the $25–30k band is why the royalty burden increases at higher prices, but also why the structure provides some natural revenue sharing with the state at windfall price levels.

Which is, by the way, completely fair.

The indigenous community contribution is 0.4% of gross annual lithium sales revenue, paid quarterly to designated Colla communities per the CEOL terms and related private agreements.

The local government contribution is also 0.4% of gross annual revenue, allocated to the Atacama Regional Government and local municipalities, and is deductible from the ad valorem royalty.

The sustainable productive development contribution is 15% of the ad valorem royalty, paid to state institutions, and is also deductible from the ad valorem royalty amount.

The Mining Operating Margin Royalty applies progressively on operating margin: 0% where the operating margin is below 20%, rising to 15.5% where the operating margin exceeds 99%, with progressive rates in between.

In aggregate, the combined weighted average fiscal burden at $22,500 per tonne and 15,000 tonnes per year is approximately 6.1% of gross revenues — equivalent to approximately $18 million per year at steady state.

This rises to approximately $25 million per year from 2047, reflecting the exhaustion of depreciation allowances under the Margin Royalty — a timing effect already captured in the PFS economic model.

But by 2047 we’re rich so unless you’re a fund manager (and I know some of you are) it’s ultimately irrelevant.

On annual revenues of $331 million, an $18 million combined fiscal burden is 5.4% — entirely manageable and already fully reflected in the $959 million after-tax NPV.

Secondary Assets

Viento Andino is CTL’s secondary development asset, located approximately 100 kilometres south of Laguna Verde within the same Atacama Region, covering a 127 square kilometre licence area.

It shares the same fundamental hydrogeological characteristics as Laguna Verde - a closed endorheic basin with a volcanic-hosted brine aquifer, established year-round road access, and proximity to existing grid infrastructure — a substation at the Maricunga mine sits approximately 10 kilometres away.

The JORC resource of August 2023, totals 0.92 million tonnes LCE at an average grade of 207 mg/L — higher average grade than Laguna Verde.

Of that, 0.44 million tonnes is Indicated and 0.48 million tonnes Inferred. Six wells have been drilled to date while three further drillholes have been recommended to improve the Measured and Indicated classification and obtain porosity data.

A September 2023 Scoping Study outlined a 20,000 tonne per year LCE operation with a post-tax NPV at 8% of approximately $1.1 billion and an IRR of approximately 43.5% at $22,500 per tonne, with capex of approximately $450 million.

These are Scoping Study-level estimates only, not PFS grade, and cannot be relied upon for investment purposes in their current form.

But they do illustrate the very real scale of the opportunity.

The strategic significance of Viento Andino lies in its infrastructure synergy with Laguna Verde. Both projects are expected to share the Copiapó lithium carbonate conversion plant.

The incremental capital required for Viento Andino is therefore materially lower than a comparable standalone project because the most capital-intensive and technically complex downstream processing infrastructure already exists.

The combined resource base of 2.82 million tonnes LCE across the two assets presents a multi-decade, scalable Chilean lithium platform of genuine institutional scale, and obivously improves the attractiveness of the strategic partner process.

Meanwhile, Arenas Blancas is CTL’s early-stage exploration position, covering a 200 square kilometre licence area on the periphery of the Salar de Atacama — which is the world’s most productive lithium basin, responsible for approximately 25–30% of global battery-grade lithium supply and host to the world’s largest known lithium reserves of approximately 9.3 million tonnes LCE.

The Salar de Atacama is where SQM and Albemarle operate at a combined scale that dominates global supply.

Geophysical surveys indicate the highly lithium-enriched subsurface aquifer characteristic of the Atacama basin extends into CTL’s licence area.

A well drilled by a third party less than 2 kilometres from CTL’s western licence blocks averaged 2,100 mg/L Li — approximately twelve times the average Laguna Verde resource grade and among the highest brine grades ever recorded anywhere in Chile.

However, I believe that any commercial development in the core Salar de Atacama would require a joint venture with a minimum 51% state entity stake under the National Lithium Strategy - though the company notes this has yet to be confirmed.

Arenas Blancas is attributed nil value in all CTL modelling and is not included in any financial analysis.

But it’s blue-sky optionality on the world’s most prolific lithium basin.

Dream Team

The single most critical management decision in CTL’s history was the appointment of Ignacio Mehech as CEO in April 2025.

Mehech spent seven years at Albemarle — the world’s largest lithium producer — with his final three years as Country Manager for Chile, managing 1,100 employees and overseeing operations, government relations and indigenous stakeholder engagement at the highest level of the Chilean lithium industry.

He is Chilean.

He speaks Spanish natively and is fluent in English, having worked for US entities and studied law in Chile and Australia.

He has direct personal relationships with CORFO, the Ministry of Mining and indigenous community leaders that no other junior developer in Chile can claim to replicate.

Usually I shy away from stating the connections advantage, but you can’t run Chile for Albemarle without getting in some serious WhatsApp groups.

The successful conclusion of CEOL terms with the Chilean government in March 2026 — thirteen months after Mehech joined — is arguably a product of his industry standing, his ministerial relationships and his ability to navigate a complex multi-stakeholder government process in a way that his predecessor could not.

The board has been substantially renewed since 2025.

Steve Kesler, Non-Executive Chairman since the AIM listing, served as the first CEO of Collahuasi, one of the world’s largest copper operations, and as VP at Escondida during its growth to over one million tonnes per year of copper production — both landmark Chilean mining projects giving him in-country relationships directly relevant to CTL.

He subsequently served as CEO of ASX-listed European Lithium and held senior roles at Rio Tinto and BHP, and holds a PhD in Mineral Technology.

Paul Atherton, appointed in October 2025 as Independent NED and Audit Chair, combines a geology degree from Imperial College London with Chartered Accountant qualifications from Deloitte and experience as both CFO and then CEO of Heritage Oil, a former FTSE 250 energy company.

That progression — from geologist to senior finance executive to listed company CEO — gives him an unusually broad perspective across the technical, governance and capital markets disciplines most relevant to CTL’s current phase.

Todd Ross, appointed in April 2026 specifically to support the ASX dual-listing process, spent more than twenty years in investment banking as Managing Director, Head of Western Australia and Head of Metals and Mining at BNP Paribas, where he played a central role in Australian lithium project financings including a major transaction involving Pilbara Minerals.

His appointment signals the seriousness of the ASX listing intent and brings pre-existing relationships with Australian institutional lithium investors.

Leo Koot, appointed last week as a non-exec, brings more than 30 years of project development and financing experience across energy and natural resources including the delivery of a billion-dollar project in the Middle East, former Managing Director of TAQA’s UK business overseeing six major North Sea offshore assets, and current chairmanship of Tulip Oil Holdings following its €380 million gas portfolio divestment.

Importantly, Koot has been a CTL shareholder since December 2021 — he invested at the pre-IPO stage — and has been acting as a Board Observer on behalf of the convertible loan note holders since August 2025.

The fact that the CLN holders chose him to represent their interests, and the Board subsequently invited him to join as a director, speaks to the quality of his engagement with the company’s strategic direction.

Gordon Stein, the CFO, is serving under a consulting arrangement initially through June 2026 to lead engagement with CF&Co on the strategic partner and financing process and on the ASX dual-listing which is likely to conclude in Q3 2026.

The appointment of a CFO with AIM and/or ASX experience and mining project finance credentials is identified as an outstanding governance item as the company transitions into the development financing phase.

Applications in please.

The management incentive structure also sends a message of alignment.

ESG

Under Chile’s National Lithium Strategy, environmental and social standards are embedded in the CEOL framework itself.

As noted above, DLE with brine reinjection is mandated.

Indigenous community consultation is a prerequisite for CEOL eligibility. Social contribution mechanisms are written into the contract’s financial terms.

For CleanTech, ESG compliance is not something layered on top of the development model. It is the development model.

The environmental advantages of DLE over legacy evaporation ponds are massive.

For example, solar evaporation loses 95% of extracted brine water to evaporation. CTL’s process reinjects all depleted brine and process effluents back into the basin aquifer, maintaining their hydraulic balance and eliminating the aquifer depletion risk that is the primary long-term environmental vulnerability of legacy Atacama operations.

Net freshwater consumption at the Laguna Verde site is approximately 161,000 cubic metres per year — sourced from surface flows and groundwater, not the lithium aquifer — representing a fraction of the estimated 18 billion litres per year of basin recharge.

No evaporation ponds.

Minimal surface disturbance.

Again, DLE production cycles complete in hours to days rather than 12 to 18 months, reducing in-process inventory, working capital requirements, and ongoing environmental exposure.

Fear not. The project is not located within SNASPE protected areas. The nearest national park (Nevado Tres Cruces) is approximately 30 kilometres away.

The project lies within a Zone of Tourist Interest (ZOIT) but exploration activities have been designed to minimise impacts, and ZOIT designation doesn’t prevent any development.

The community engagement programme is, by any standard of comparison, exceptional for a junior developer at this stage.

Laguna Verde is described as the first lithium project in Chile to be co-designed with indigenous communities from the outset — not as a compliance exercise, but as a participatory model initiated before any regulatory requirement to do so.

The Colla Pai-Ote, Río Jorquera and Pastos Grandes communities, whose traditional territories span the project area and transport corridors, have been engaged continuously since 2021. All of these communities are located over 100 km away on the transport corridors.

A formal alliance was signed in December 2023, establishing a joint working group with shared governance over the project-community interface, including transparent decision pathways on land access, transport routes and wildlife corridors.

Three formal community support letters were submitted with the CEOL application.

The Colla Pai-Ote community even sent a letter to the Chilean Minister of Mining in March 2024 explicitly supporting the CEOL application — a rare public endorsement cited in the CEOL application and acknowledged by the Ministry.

The Board has been hosted on-site by communities at the project area. The has been exactly zero community opposition events, protests or conflict incidents have occurred since project commencement in 2021.

Compare that to Devon!

Post-CEOL, the framework embeds formal contractual community commitments. The 0.4% of gross revenue indigenous community contribution is contractual, paid quarterly. CTL has additionally committed to a dedicated Community Development Fund post-ratification with benefit sharing tied directly to production milestones, support for pastoral mobility corridors protecting traditional Colla livestock routes, joint biodiversity monitoring programmes, and investment in health, education, and emergency infrastructure in high-altitude community zones where state infrastructure is limited.

A partnership with Universidad de Atacama has also been established to develop employment and local skills pipelines, creating a supply of locally trained workers for operations at the Copiapó plant.

Now naturally.

This ESG positioning is commercially material and it’s not entirely charitable (though the CEO as a Chilean national will support it wholeheartedly).

For example, the EU Battery Regulation, effective from 2026 for certain battery categories, requires battery manufacturers to demonstrate supply chain due diligence including environmental and human rights standards at the extraction stage.

A Chilean CEOL holder using DLE with brine reinjection, no evaporation ponds, three years of verified indigenous community co-design, and contractual social contribution mechanisms embedded in the operating licence is structurally better positioned to meet these requirements than a higher-footprint evaporative producer in Argentina or Bolivia.

This is a competitive differentiator for offtake negotiations — particularly with European cathode producers, Japanese trading houses, Korean battery manufacturers and US OEMs — and it directly supports the attractiveness of the CF&Co partner process.

And in the real world, it’s a damn sight easier operating when your neighbours want you there.

Valuation Framework

At 7.5p pre-placing and an enterprise value of £15 million, CTL trades at approximately $6.9 per tonne of EV/Resource on its combined 2.82 million tonne LCE portfolio (1.9 million tonnes Laguna Verde plus 0.92 million tonnes Viento Andino).

This is generally the primary valuation metric for pre-production lithium brine developers at this stage.

The peer landscape as of late April 2026 looks like this:

Standard Lithium (SLI), at FID with a Trafigura-backed offtake, trades at approximately $141.6 per tonne. This defines the upper bound for fully funded construction-stage projects.

Argosy Minerals (AGY), at pilot production in Latin America — the most directly relevant operational DLE benchmark — trades at approximately $87.1 per tonne, reflecting its early-stage operational validation.

Galan Lithium (GLN), in commissioning, trades at approximately $27.3 per tonne and broadly anchors the peer median.

Lake Resources (LKE), trading at approximately $10.1 per tonne following DFS delays and financing pathway difficulties (poor old Lake, it’ll get there), is below the peer median and is not considered an appropriate floor comparator for a post-CEOL project like CTL.

Lithium Chile (LITH), at approximately $23.9 per tonne, is the closest CEOL-stage comparable — though its market cap continues to trade at a discount to the announced $175 million Arizaro transaction, suggesting the market is attributing limited standalone value to the CEOL itself and that the strategic partner announcement will be its primary re-rating event.

Recent M&A precedents include the Arizaro sale at approximately $43 per tonne in December 2025 — a pre-DFS project with no CEOL equivalent — which is the most directly relevant recent transaction.

The Millennial Lithium acquisition at approximately $91 per tonne in 2021 is possibly the other decent comparator.

CTL, with both a completed PFS and agreed CEOL terms, is structurally better placed than the Arizaro transaction was at the time of sale but trades at a fraction of that benchmark.

I hope Fox-Davies doesn’t mind me quoting their risked NAV approach - which roughly echoes what I would calculate anyway.

They applied an 85% development-stage discount to the after-tax NPV10 of $699 million to reflect undeployed CAPEX ($748 million plus $65 million working capital), execution risk, financing dilution and the time value to first production in 2031.

This yielded a risked NAV of $104.9 million. Converting to GBP at 1.27: £82.6 million.

On a basic share basis of 204.2 million shares: 40.5p per share. On a fully diluted basis of 407.7 million shares plus £8.66 million of option exercise proceeds: 22.4p per share.

Applying the same 85% discount to NPV8 ($959 million) instead of NPV10 would yield $143.9 million or approximately 35p per share fully diluted.

Using NPV10 ($699 million) as the input is therefore the more conservative basis.

At 80% discount, the risked NAV yields 23.4p fully diluted; at 90% discount, 11.7p.

Even the maximum stress scenario produces a per-share value materially above the current share price.

And this is without the lithium boom sending the mineral to the moon.

The risked NAV of $104.9 million is equivalent to a $37.2 per tonne EV/Resource multiple — sitting naturally between the strategic partner re-rating step ($35 per tonne = 21.2p FD) and the ASX listing step ($40 per tonne = 23.9p FD).

This convergence between the NPV-based approach and the market comparable approach appears to signal strong internal cross-validation.

Balance Sheet Reset

Last week, CTL announced several material developments simultaneously.

The fundraising raised approximately £4.8 million by way of a placing - and approximately £250,000 via a WRAP retail offer - both at 6p per share. That retail offer resulted in extra demand with the retail offer totalling nearly £604,000 which was announced this week.

An outstanding result in a market dominated by SpaceX and the 20 or so new companies currently attempting to list on AIM.

The issue price represented a 26% discount to the prior closing price of 8.15p and comprised a firm tranche of 39,170,424 shares ($2.35 million, within existing authorities) and a conditional tranche of 35,829,576 shares (approximately £2.15 million, subject to shareholder approval at the General Meeting expected 1 July 2026).

A bookrunner option for up to 10 million additional shares at 6p, exercisable by Fox-Davies Capital until 19 June 2026, provides further upside on demand.

Chairman Steve Kesler is subscribing for 4.6 million new shares at 6p to settle £276,273 of accrued director’s fees — skin in the game.

Every fundraising share carries a warrant at a ratio of one warrant for every two shares subscribed, exercisable at 9p from one year after admission until three years after admission. At 9p, the warrant exercise price sits between the current market price and the conservative 12-month target range, offering additional leverage.

Warrants are good news by the way. They mean supportive shareholders fund the next round of capital needed. It’s not 2024 anymore.

The proceeds will fund licence acquisition costs at Laguna Verde, commence EIA work — now confirmed as the critical path item — support ongoing DLE process refinement and CAPEX/OPEX trade-off analysis, fund ASX dual-listing costs, and provide working capital through the partner selection process.

The headline development, more important than the fundraising size itself, is the loan note conversion.

The outstanding convertible loan notes — restructured in August 2025 with a 30 June 2026 maturity and a 12% per annum premium, which have weighed on the balance sheet and suppressed the stock throughout — have been fully converted to equity.

The total amount converted is AUD$5,064,778 plus £758,022, resulting in the issue of 64,464,675 conversion shares.

Regal Funds Management, as trustee for the Regal Emerging Companies Opportunities Fund, will receive 47,003,253 of those conversion shares and will hold 20.7% of the enlarged share capital following First Admission, gaining the right to appoint a non-executive director or board observer for so long as it holds 10% or more of issued capital.

The fact that the CLN holders — all shareholders and sophisticated institutional investors who could have demanded cash redemption — chose instead to convert their entire position to equity at current prices is the most powerful signal in today’s announcement.

These are institutional investors making a calculated, informed decision to increase their equity exposure to CTL with the strategic partner process live, the CEOL ratification imminent, and the ASX listing being actively progressed.

That decision speaks to their conviction about the trajectory of the next twelve months.

I will note that the civil dispute and related criminal complaint from the Laguna Verde licence vendors remain outstanding, but I don’t view this as a serious risk.

Ultimately the criminal complaint over what amounts to a contract issue (CleanTech owes them money, and will pay having now raised cash, but is late paying) is not something to stress about.

For context, the company denies the criminal allegations, and has confirmed there is no impact on CEOL or wider operations. In any event, the CEOL terms were agreed subsequent to the legal case announcement.

However, paying them their money ASAP makes a lot of sense after which I suspect the cases will be closed.

Permitting Roadmap

The pathway from CEOL to Final Investment Decision is well-defined and has no real regulatory risks - though, yes, some risk always applies.

CEOL Comptroller ratification is expected very soon.

(Yes, I know that word induces PTSD).

This converts the current agreed status to formally awarded, the formal start of the 40-year clock, and the legal foundation required by project lenders before beginning credit work.

Administrative process only, can’t alter agreed terms, board unaware of any blocking issues.

EIA work is programmed to recommence this month. Whilst advanced pre-EIA baseline studies were completed with MYMA environmental consultants in 2022 and 2023, providing over two years of baseline data ahead of submission — above the one-year minimum typically required – these now need updating and this work will begin imminently.

Community co-authorship of the human environment and ecology chapters of the EIA, established through the formal community alliance, will reduce re-work risk and demonstrates the quality of stakeholder engagement.

SEIA review runs for perhaps 18–24 months from submission. Be aware that the Resolution of Environmental Qualification (RCA) is required before construction.

The critical path for FID 2028 requires RCA approval by approximately mid-2027.

No serious EIA flaws have been identified at the PFS stage, and the new Kast administration has explicitly flagged expedited permitting as a policy priority, with the potential to shorten the review timeline.

DFS and project financing run in parallel with the SEIA review, funded via the Phase 1 pre-development capital from our selected strategic partner ($40 million).

DFS tightens the current AACE Class 4 cost estimate to Class 3 or better, providing the bankable engineering basis for construction contracts. FEED follows DFS and provides detailed engineering for procurement.

FID is targeted for 2028, conditioned on RCA approval, DFS completion, the financing package being secured and CEOL Comptroller ratification (already underway).

Construction occurs across 2029 and 2030, with the $748 million split 35%/65% across the two years. A 600-person construction camp at Laguna Verde salar site and urban-environment Copiapó plant construction will arrive in parallel.

First commercial production starts in 2031.

Then we can all relax.

The Bottom Line

Here we go.

CleanTech has agreed the terms of a 40-year exclusive operating contract with the Chilean government — one of only a small number of companies to have received such a contract — for a lithium project sitting on 1.90 million tonnes of resource with 1.52 million tonnes of that not even included in the mine plan. This doesn’t include the potential upside from Viento Andino which currently holds 0.92 million tonnes of resource.

It has published a PFS for its main asset confirming an after-tax NPV of $959 million, an IRR of 21.2%, an operating cost of $5,768 per tonne which sits in the lowest quartile globally, and an all-in payback of approximately four years from first production.

It has demonstrated battery-grade lithium carbonate production from its own brine at 99.78% purity, independently verified by a German laboratory, and is currently running two further validation trials to produce approximately 300 kilograms of product for strategic partner qualification.

It has assembled a management team with direct government relationships, community relationships and project development experience at the highest level of Chile’s lithium industry.

It has appointed one of the most experienced project finance advisory firms in the global mining sector — Cutfield Freeman & Co, with over 200 transactions and $20 billion in advisory experience — to run a strategic partner process with multiple major industry players already in the data room having signed NDAs.

It has cleaned up its balance sheet, converting all outstanding convertible loan notes to equity — with the CLN holders making an active decision to roll their position into equity rather than take cash — while simultaneously raising £5.4 million to fund the EIA and DFS preparation work that cannot wait for the partner to be selected.

It is pursuing an ASX dual-listing with an Australian-resident board member specifically appointed for the purpose, targeting a market that consistently values LatAm DLE projects at multiples three to five times higher than AIM.

Its management incentive structure is now aligned with shareholder value creation milestones — positive DFS, environmental permit, project finance secured, commercial production, 50p share price — not with short-term share price movements or administrative benchmarks.

And it’s trading at a 98% discount to its own independently assessed after-tax asset value, a 75% discount to the peer median EV/Resource multiple, and at roughly one-sixth of the most recent comparable Latin American brine M&A transaction.

Therefore, unlike some of my more speculative investments, my re-rating thesis does not require heroic assumptions.

It does not require lithium prices to surge, though I am certain they will.

All we need is CEOL ratification — expected imminently, already agreed, Comptroller cannot change the terms. We require a strategic partner announcement — process live, major parties in the data room, proposals sought by end-June. And we want an ASX listing — being actively progressed with an Australian-resident director on the board procured for this purpose.

Each of these is independently catalytic.

Together they define a sequential path from today’s 6p to the 3-4x range where two separate brokerage firms have independently set their targets — using different methodologies, on different sets of assumptions, arriving at the same conclusion.

At 20p, CTL would still trade at a 95% discount to its own NPV. At 35p, it would still be below the December 2025 Arizaro M&A transaction that had no CEOL and no feasibility study. At 50p— the CEO’s own long-term incentive option threshold — it would still trade at a fraction of Argosy’s operational multiple.

When the lithium market crashed a few years ago, they didn’t stop working. They drilled, and they developed the pilot plant. $40 million has been spent on this project and as the boom returns, the reward is being ahead of the game.

In junior resource, the gap between what has been built and what has been priced occasionally opens wide enough to be difficult to justify ignoring.

The trick is identifying those moments before the catalyst closes the gap rather than after. CTL’s catalysts are known, imminent and independently confirmable.

In hindsight, it’ll look obvious.