Amaroq.

Nothing has changed.

Good Morning Team.

A few weeks ago I laid out the updated investment case for Amaroq.

I told you the production ramp was arriving on schedule, and that the cost structure was improving.

And I told you the numbers at $5,000 gold look excellent.

Amaroq has now drifted back to 101p, having very briefly dipped below that psychological £1 mark.

Please take a moment to thank the sellers.

They have handed out a gift to anyone paying attention — by selling a cash-generating gold producer at a discount, likely because of geopolitical fear that has zero bearing on Nalunaq’s ore body, Amaroq’s mining licences, or the Phase 2 flotation circuit.

Let’s briefly restate the pure gold case, because the simplicity is the point.

Q4 2026 guidance: 10,000-12,000 ounces.

AISC: $1,250-1,450 per ounce.

At $5,000 gold, the margin is $3,550-3,750 per ounce.

On 11,000 ounces at the midpoint, that is approximately $40 million in free cash flow from a single quarter.

Annualised from that Q4 run-rate:

$160 million in free cash flow per year.

From one mine.

Before Nanoq, Black Angel or any government support.

For the full year 2026, using the 30,000 ounce midpoint: revenue of $150 million against full-year AISC of $69-73 million, leaving approximately $78-81 million in free cash flow — and that number is heavily suppressed by the lower-production H1 before Phase 2 is fully online.

The current market cap at 101p is approximately £470 million. A company generating $80 million in free cash flow this year, ramping to $160 million annualised by year-end, is trading at a 22% free cash flow yield on its run-rate.

That is a distressed business multiple.

Amaroq is not a distressed business.

The flotation circuit is not being priced in.

Recovery rates jumping from roughly 60% on the gravity circuit to 90-95% once flotation is fully commissioned is a structural step-change that transforms this from a development story to a cash-generative mid-tier producer.

The contractor-to-owner-operator transition compounds it further, with management explicitly guiding for lower H2 costs as drilling, processing and camp support move in-house.

Every ounce in H2 costs less to produce than every ounce in H1. The margin expansion in the guidance.

While retail investors were selling Amaroq because of the Hormuz noise, the United States government has been moving in the opposite direction entirely.

In January, CEO Eldur Ólafsson appeared on CNBC and confirmed that the US government is actively considering investing in Amaroq’s Greenland mining projects — discussions covering offtake agreements, infrastructure support and credit lines.

The State Department confirmed publicly its eagerness to build lasting commercial relationships in Greenland.

Trump signed an executive order earmarking billions for mining projects critical to national security.

Clearly, the US is considering investing through EXIM — the US Export-Import Bank.

The people selling Amaroq are selling a company that the US government is attempting to fund, at a moment when the White House has signed an executive order specifically designed to back projects like this one.

Now consider what a US government investment actually means in structural terms, because I don’t think the market has modelled this properly.

An EXIM credit line provides non-dilutive capital — the balance sheet strengthens without shareholders being diluted. An offtake agreement on the critical minerals side provides a guaranteed sovereign revenue floor at the precise moment China has demonstrated its willingness to weaponise those supply chains.

And the strategic endorsement transforms Amaroq’s institutional investor universe overnight.

When the US government backs this mining project, it will not remain a small-cap.

It’ll hit the headlines.

And then there’s everything else — because the US funding angle sits on top of a portfolio that is generating zero value in the current share price.

When Trump put tariffs on China, the first two metals China stopped exporting were germanium and gallium.

Amaroq has both at Black Angel. Already in the ground. Already confirmed at commercial scale.

Black Angel is on course for Phase 1 mining in 2028, with feasibility studies underway and surface facility rehabilitation begun. A zinc-lead-silver operation with the two metals at the centre of the US-China supply chain war, on the same balance sheet as Nalunaq, currently valued at nothing.

Nanoq is advancing toward a Maiden Mineral Resource Estimate, with systematic drilling of the Central Zone underway.

I have said repeatedly that Nanoq results will be a major re-rating catalyst entirely independent of Nalunaq production. That remains true. The work to establish that resource is now active.

The Minturn IOCG — copper, gold, uranium and rare earths in a single system — is receiving scout drilling following identification of what management described in a regulatory announcement as a mineral system of significant scale.

Suliaq, the support services and logistics business, has previously been independently valued at £40 million. Independent financing discussions are ongoing.

It is currently valued at nothing in the share price. When that crystallises — through a partial sale, JV, or debt facility — it will appear on the balance sheet having been invisible for years.

The entire portfolio — Nanoq, Black Angel, Minturn, Stendalen nickel-copper, Ilua REE, Suliaq — is active and advancing simultaneously. None of it is in the price.

And then there’s the structural buying that hasn’t happened yet — but will.

Citi has taken Amaroq on as a client as the company prepares for its London Main Market uplisting.

One of the largest investment banks on the planet, after forensic due diligence, has chosen to back this company’s institutional debut.

Cavendish has initiated coverage with a 204p target — implying over 100% upside from the current 101p.

It’s not hard to see why that’s their ballpark.

Consider that at $160 million annualised FCF by Q4, a 10x FCF multiple (conservative for a growth producer) = $1.6 billion market cap, or roughly 230p per share.

At 15x (sector norm for a re-rating story at $5,000 gold) = 345p.

Prefer a peer NAV approach? Small/mid gold producers at $5,000 gold are trading at 1.5-2.5x NAV. Nalunaq alone at these margins implies a mine NAV well north of $400 million — before Nanoq, Black Angel, or the critical minerals portfolio.

At 2x NAV on Nalunaq alone, you’re at a $800+ million market cap, or 170p. Add in the optionality and you’re back toward 200p+.

EIFO, Denmark’s state-backed export and investment fund, is already a top-three shareholder. The shareholder list already reads like a roll call of Western strategic interests.

Add EXIM? You’ll have both sides of the Atlantic formally invested.

The Main Market uplisting is a structural buying event — index inclusion, passive fund inflows, mandated allocation from institutions that cannot touch AIM-listed stocks.

None of those flows have happened yet.

All of them are coming.

By Q4 2026, when Nalunaq delivers 10,000-12,000 ounces at $1,250-1,450 AISC, Phase 2 fully commissioned, $5,000 gold, US government funding potentially secured, Nanoq resource advancing, and institutional flows beginning in earnest — we’ll have re-rated.

Keep calm.

And carry on.